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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
J. Rodney Johnson * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In its 1999 Session, the General Assembly enacted legislation 
dealing with wills, trusts, and estates that added, amended, or 
repealed a number of sections of the Code of Virginia in its 1999 
Session. In addition, there were eleven Supreme Court of Virginia 
opinions and one Bankruptcy Court opinion in the period covered by 
this review that involved issues of interest to the general practitio-
ner as well as the specialist in wills, trusts, and estates. This article 
reports on all of these legislative and judicial developments.1 
II. LEGISLATION 
A Fiduciary Investments-Uniform Prudent Investor Act 
Acting upon the recommendations of a joint study of fiduciary 
investing that was prepared by the Virginia Bar Association and the 
Virginia Bankers Association, the 1992 Session repealed Virginia's 
traditional prudent man rule and replaced it with a portfolio-
oriented prudent investor rule. 2 The 1999 Session replaced this 1992 
version of the prudent investor rule with the Uniform Prudent 
Investor Act, 3 which will apply to all fiduciaries' actions and 
decisions occurring after December 31, 1999, even if their control-
* Professor of Law, emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law. 
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Virginia Code sections, they will 
often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated, those 
section numbers will refer to the latest printing of the old sections and to the 1999 
supplement for the new sections. 
2. See Act of Apr. 6, 1992, ch. 810, 1992 Va. Acts 1278 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 2.1-328, 5.1-88.2, 6.1-21, 6.1-195.86, 26-40, 26-40.01, 26-44, 26-45.1, 51.1-803, 54.1-
1119, 54.1-2113 (Repl. Vol. 1995)). The background and scope of this legislation is discussed 
in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 26 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 873, 890-91 (1992). 
3. UNIF. PRUDENT lNvESTORACT, 7B U.L.A. 57 (1985) (Supp. 1999). Copies of the Act, 
containing the Commissioners' official comments, which will be very important to an 
understanding the Act's operation, may be obtained from the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 211 East Ontario Street, Suite 1300, Chicago, Illinois 
60611. . 
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ling document became effective prior to that date.4 Although the 
basic concept of Virginia's prudent-investor rule is not changed by 
the Uniform Act, the latter does (i) contain a clearer and more 
comprehensive expression of the rule, (ii) align Virginia with the 
majority of other states, and (iii) deal with a number of other 
parallel concerns where statutory guidance will be helpful, such as 
diversification, loyalty, impartiality, delegation of investment and 
management functions, duties at inception of trust, etc. 5 Although 
a detailed comparison of the Uniform Act to prior Virginia law is not 
feasible within the confines of this annual review, a listing of the 
significant Virginia modifications to the Uniform Act will be found 
in the footnotes. 6 
B. Fiduciary Accounting-Uniform Principal and Income Act 
The regular course of a trustee's or personal representative's 
stewardship contemplates a number and variety of receipts and 
expenditures. The correct allocation of these items between present 
4. See Act of Mar. 28, 1999, ch. 772, 1999 Va. Acts 1356 (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 26-45.3 to -45.14 (Cum. Supp. 1999)). 
5. See id. 
6. The following are the Virginia amendments to the Uniform Act, all of which were 
proposed by the Virginia Bar Association's Section on Wills, Trusts, and Estates. All section 
references are to the Act as enacted in Virginia, and not as originally promulgated. 
(1) § 26-45.3(A). After the reference to "subsection B," the language "§§ 26-40 and 
26-40.01" was inserted. This is a clearer expression of a somewhat similar reference found in 
former§ 26-45.l(A). It recognizes the continuing (i) limited applicability of the "original legal 
list" and (ii) unlimited applicability of the "mini legal list." The latter's three "safe harbor" 
provisions will be of great importance to the lay fiduciary charged with investing a relatively 
small amount. 
(2) § 26-45.3(B). The second and third sentences were added to continue the provisions 
of former§ 26-45.l(E), dealing with waiver of the prudent investor rule. In the light of this 
change, this subsection's second sentence in the Uniform Act ("A trustee is not liable to a 
beneficiary to the extent that the trustee acted in reasonable reliance on the provisions of the 
trust.") was deleted as no longer necessary. 
(3) § 26-45.4(G). This entire subsection was added to continue the provisions of former 
§ 26-45. l(F), added to the Code in 1998, to deal with certain insurance concerns that are 
discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey o{Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 
32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1405, 1412 (1998). 
(4) § 26-45.11. After the word "modified," the words "by language articulating the 
investment standard to which the trustee is to be held" were inserted in order to provide for 
greater certainty ofresult in cases of claimed modification than the provisions of the Uniform 
Act were believed to give in their original formulation. 
(5) § 26-45.13. This entire section is new. The Uniform Act was drafted to be applicable 
only to "trustees" and "trusts." The amendment, taken mostly from former section 26-45. l(G), 
makes the Act applicable to all statutory fiduciaries referred to in section 8.01-2, as well as 
to an agent under a written power of attorney. 
(6) § 64.l-57(1)(c) and (cl). These statutory boilerplate powers dealing with fiduciary 
investments were deleted as being no longer necessary or desirable in light of the Act's 
adoption. 
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and future beneficiaries is determined by a jurisdiction's principal 
and income law. The 1999 Session replaced Virginia's version of the 
Uniform Principal and Income Act (1931)7 with the Uniform 
Principal and Income Act (1997)8 for all trusts, decedents' estates, 
and nontrust estates existing on January 1, 2000, except as the 
Virginia Code or a controlling document expressly provides to the 
contrary.9 It would be difficult to overstate the importance of this 
enactment because of (i) the prior conflict between investing under 
a prudent investor rule and allocating the receipts therefrom under 
prior law, 10 (ii) the number and variety of new financial instruments 
not dealt with by prior law, and (iii) the increasing use of the inter 
vivos trust as a will substitute that was not contemplated by prior 
law. Although a detailed comparison of the Uniform Act to prior 
Virginia law is not feasible within the confines of this annual 
review, a listing of the significant Virginia modifications to the 
Uniform Act will be found in the footnotes.11 
7. Act of Mar. 30, 1936, ch. 432, 1936 Va. Acts 1024 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§§ 55-253 to-268 (Repl. Vol. 1995)). 
8. UNIF. PRINCIPALAND INCOME ACT, 7B U.L.A 3 (1997) (Supp. 1999). Copies of the Act, 
containing the Commissioners' official comments, which will be indispensable to an 
understanding of the Act's operation, may be obtained from the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 211 East Ontario Street, Suite 1300, Chicago, Illinois 
60611. 
9. See Act of Apr. 7, 1999, ch. 975, 1999 Va. Acts 2568 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
.ANN. §§ 55-277.1 to -27.33 (Cum. Supp. 1999)). 
10. This conflict is discussed inJ. Rodney Johnson,Annual Survey ofVirginia Law: Wills, 
Trusts, and Estates, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 873, 890-91 (1992). The resolution of this conflict is 
found in the default rule of new section 55-277.4 that authorizes a fiduciary to make 
adjustments between the principal and income accounts in order to reach a result that is fair 
and reasonable to all beneficiaries. See VA. CODE.ANN.§ 55-277.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
11. The following are the Virginia amendments to the Uniform Act, all of which were 
proposed by the Virginia Bar Association's Section on Wills, Trusts, and Estates. All section 
references are to the Act as enacted in Virginia, and not as originally promulgated. 
(1) § 55-277.3(C). This entire subsection is new. The Uniform Act provides a body of 
default rules that can be avoided in several ways, one of which is by giving a fiduciary a 
"discretionary power of administration." The purpose of the added subsection is to guard 
against an almost universally used boilerplate power-permitting a fiduciary to "allocate 
receipts and expenses between income and principal" -from being interpreted as such a 
"discretionary power of administration." VA. CODE .ANN. § 55-277.3(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
(2) § 55-277.4. All references to "trustee" in this section were changed to "fiduciary," in 
order to make the Act's fiduciary's adjustment power applicable to the personal 
representative of a decedent's estate. 
(3) § 55-277.4(D). The second sentence of this subsection was added to incorporate an 
existing procedural remedy. 
(4) § 55-277.4(G). This entire subsection is new. It was added in order to implement the 
decision mentioned in paragraph (2) of this footnote, that is, to make this section applicable 
to a decedent's estate. 
(5) § 55-277.6. All references to "trustee" in this section were changed to "fiduciary" in 
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C. Estate Planning-Testamentary Pour-Over to Inter Vivos Trust 
Reform 
Whereas traditional estate planning has been will-based, a 
number of today's estate planners sometimes favor a plan based 
upon an inter vivos trust. In these inter vivos trust-based plans, the 
desire to integrate all of the client's assets into one management 
vehicle following the client's death is accomplished by malting a 
testamentary gift, called a "pour-over," of the client's residuary 
probate estate to the inter vivos trust. The 1999 Session replaced 
Virginia's aging pour-over statute with the more modern Uniform 
Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act (1991)12 for wills of testators 
who die after June 30, 1999.13 Although the form of the Uniform Act 
differs from its predecessor, the substance ofits pour-over provisions 
differs in only three respects-all of which are thought to be intent-
effectuating. 14 
order to make the Act's rules dealing with distributions to residuary and remainder 
beneficiaries applicable to the personal representative of a decedent's estate. 
(6) § 55-277.31. This entire section, dealing with expenses and receipts in nontrust 
estates, was added. Former section 55-265 dealt with the allocation of expenses in nontrust 
estates, but there was no prior provision relating to the apportionment ofreceipts in nontrust 
estates. 
(7) § 55-277.33. This section, dealingwith the Act's applicability, was amended to include 
references to "nontrust estates" in light of the amendment made in paragraph (6) of this 
footnote. 
(8) § 64.l-57(1)(il). A statutory boilerplate fiduciary power dealing with allocation of 
receipts and expenditures, was deleted because it (i) is no longer necessary or desirable, and 
(ii) might create an initial confusion with the "discretionary power of administration" 
discussed in paragraph (1) supra of this footnote. 
12. UNIF. TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT, BB U.L.A 66 (Supp. 1999) (codified 
as amended at VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-73.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999)). A discussion of this Act, in the 
context ofVirginia law, will be found in J. Rodney Johnson, Reforming Virginia's Pour-Over 
Rules-Three Proposals, 15 VA. ST. B. TR. &EST.NEWSL. 2 (1998). Copies of the Act, containing 
the Commissioners' official comments which will be helpful in understanding the Act's 
operation, may be obtained from the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, 211 East Ontario Street, Suite 1300, Chicago, Illinois 60611. 
13. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-73.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999). The original statute will continue 
to govern pour-overs "under the will of a decedent dying ... before July 1, 1999." Id. § 
64.l-73(H) (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
14. These changes are: (1) instead of the receptacle trust having to be executed "before 
or concurrently with" the pour-over will, it may be executed "before, concurrently with, or 
after," id.§ 64.1-73.l(A)(Cum. Supp. 1999); (2) instead ofa mandatory failure of the pour-over 
if the receptacle trust is inoperative at testator's death, it will fail "unless the testator's will 
provides otherwise," id. § 64.1-73.l(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999); and (3) instead of allowing post-
death amendments of the receptacle trust to govern the pour-over portion only "if the testator 
expressly so specifies in his will," they will govern "unless the testator's will provides 
otherwise," id.§ 64.1-73.l(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
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In addition, the 1999 legislation deals with two related matters 
that are significant changes in Virginia law and policy. First, 
although the final barriers against a nonresident individual serving 
as a sole court-appointed fiduciary of a Virginian's estate fell in 
1996, 15 there has been no corresponding relaxation of the prohibition 
against a nonresident fiduciary corporation serving in such a 
capacity.16 This complete corporate prohibition comes to an end with 
the enactment of the 1999 pour-over legislation that expressly 
permits a nonresident "entity" to serve as trustee of a receptacle 
trust receiving a pour-over under a Virginia will.17 Second, as a part 
of the earlier changes in the law allowing a nonresident individual 
to serve, noted above, it was also stipulated that such a fiduciary 
must always provide surety upon the offi,cial bond, even if the 
language of the governing document expressly waived the surety 
requirement.18 This mandatory surety requirement is now elimi-
nated for any nonresident, individual or entity, serving as trustee of 
an inter vivos trust receiving a pour-over under a Virginia will.19 
D. Guardian of Minor-Reform 
During the study of Virginia's adult guardianship laws that 
culminated in legislative reform in 1997,20 a number of parallel 
problems were discovered in the guardianship laws applicable to the 
property of minors. These latter problems have been addressed in a 
comprehensive reform package drafted by the Wills, Trusts, and 
Estates section of the Virginia Bar Association, and enacted by the 
1999 Session. The new legislation "makes a guardianship more like 
a typical minor's trust insofar as the guardian's administrative and 
distributive powers" are concerned.21 Although the nature and space 
15. The same was also true in regard to the privately appointed trustee of an inter vivos 
trust who was intended to receive a pour-over addition under the settlor's will. For the history 
of this evolution, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and 
Estates, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1249 (1997), and sources therein cited. 
16. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-59(B) (Repl. Vol. 1997); id.§ 64.l-73(A)(2)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 
1999). 
17. See id.§ 64.1-73.l(D) (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
18. See id.§ 64.1-73(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
19. See id. For a discussion of the two changes mentioned in this paragraph, see Johnson, 
supra note 12. 
20. For an excellent discussion of this 1997 legislation by a person who was involved in 
every step of its development, see John E. Donaldson, Reform of Adult Guardianship Law, 
32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1273 (1998). 
21. H.B. 1633, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Feb. 27, 1999, ch. 
16, 1999 Va. Acts 22) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.§§ 26-17.4, 31-1to-9,31-14, 31-
18.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999)). The act is "applicable to all guardianships, whenever created, except 
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limitations of this survey article preclude any meaningful analysis 
of this far-reaching legislation, a summary of its major elements 
would include the following: (1) clarifying the standard governing 
expenditures for a minor's benefit, requiring a minor's other 
resources to be taken into account in making disbursements, and 
eliminating the prohibition against use of principal for a minor's 
benefit without prior court approval;22 (2) endowing the guardian 
with extensive administrative powers over the minor's estate, 
including the power to sell real estate unless, in the latter case, the 
court or commissioner of accounts affirmatively imposes require-
ments on such a sale;23 and (3) codifying Virginia's common-law 
prohibition against using a minor's property for the minor's support 
where the minor has a parent capable of providing such support.24 
In regard to a parent's support obligation, the legislation as 
introduced would not permit the assets of a minor who has a living 
parent to be expended for the minor's benefit without (i) permission 
in the document under which the minor's estate is derived, or (ii) a 
court order entered in a proceeding in which the minor is repre-
sented by a guardian ad litem wherein the judge makes one of three 
alternative factual findings.25 However, as a result of the lobbying 
efforts of the Virginia Conference of Commissioners of Accounts, 26 
that a guardian who qualifies prior to July 1, 1999, shall have the power to make conveyances 
of his ward's estate only in accordance with the laws in effect on June 30, 1999 [unless such 
a guardian requalifies thereafter]." VA. CODE ANN. § 31-18.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
22. "[A)fter first taking into account the minor's other sources of income, support rights, 
and other reasonably available resources of which the guardian is aware, [the guardian] shall 
provide for the minor's health, education, maintenance and support from the income of such 
estate and, if income is not sufficient, from the corpus thereof." Id. § 31-8 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
23. These powers are found in VA. CODE ANN. section 31-14.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999). The 
real- estate restriction is found in section 31-14.l(B). 
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 31-8.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999); see also 9AMICHIE'SJURISPRUDENCE 
Parent and Child § 20 (discussing the common law background); Supreme Court of Virginia 
Form CC-1683 (INST) (1998) (Instructions for Account for Minor) ("[A] Guardian may use the 
income earned on the minor's estate for the maintenance and education of the minor, only to 
the extent the parent(s) cannot provide for those expenses.") The necessity of such a rule is 
obvious because, in its absence, the child's funds could be used to satisfy the parent's legal 
obligation of support, and thus the parent-not the child-would become the de facto 
beneficiary of the child's assets. For this reason, the parent so benefitting from a child's assets 
would have to include the amount in question in the parent's gross income for income tax 
purposes. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (1988). 
25. The court must find "that (a) the parent is unable to completely fulfill the parental 
duty of supporting the child, (b) the parent cannot for some reason be required to provide such 
support, or (c) a proposed distribution is beyond the scope of parental duty of support in the 
circumstances ofa specific case." VA. CODE ANN.§ 31-8.l(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
26. This is a trade organization of commissioners of accounts. It should not be confused 
with the Standing Committee on Commissioners of Accounts created by the Judicial Council 
of Virginia in 1993, briefly discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: 
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the introduced legislation was amended by the addition of a new 
section 31-8.2 that empowers a commissioner of accounts "to 
authorize the same distributions under the same circumstances as 
the court may authorize . . . except that (i) the total distributions 
authorized in any one year shall not exceed $3,000 .... "27 Although 
one can understand and be sympathetic to a desire for a shortcut 
procedure in small cases, this particular shortcut appears to be 
unconstitutional because its language goes on to expressly provide 
that "[t]he provisions of§ 31-8.1 B shall not apply to proceedings 
under this section."28 Section 31-8.l(B), thus made inapplicable in 
cases before a commissioner, requires the appointment of a guardian 
ad litem for a minor whose funds are being taken in a circuit court 
proceeding. 29 Thus, as newly added section 31-8.2 permits the taking 
of a minor's property for a parent's benefit in a preceding before a 
commissioner without anyone appearing on the minor's behalf,30 it 
would appear to be a taking without due process oflaw.31 
E. Tenancy by the Entirety-Personal Property 
The form of concurrent ownership known as the tenancy by the 
entirety, which can exist only between a husband and wife, is the 
most popular form of real estate ownership for married couples in 
Virginia. The primary reason for this popularity is the immunity of 
such property from the claims of the individual (but not the joint) 
creditors of the husband and the wife.32 There has been increasing 
uncertainty, however, concerning whether, and if so to what extent, 
· personal property might be held in this fashion.33 The1999 Session 
attempted to eliminate this uncertainty by adding section 55-20.1 to 
the Virginia Code, providing in part that "[a]ny persons may own 
real or personal property ... if husband and wife, as tenants by the 
entireties."34 However, as this statute does not contain an effective 
Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1249, 1268 (1997). 
27. VA. CODE.ANN.§ 31-8.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
28. Id. 
29. See id. § 31-8.l(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
30. See id. § 31-8.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
31. Section 31-8.2 does give one, ineffectual, nod in the direction of due process with its 
provision that "the commissioner shall give five days written notice of the scheduled hearing 
date to any minor who is fourteen years of age or older." Id. 
32. This point was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia in the recent case of 
Rogers v. Rogers, 257 Va. 323, 512 S.E.2d 821 (1999). See infra Part III.J. 
33. For an excellent discussion of the multiple facets of this uncertainty, see the opinion 
in the recent case of In re Massey, 225 B.R. 887 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998). See discussion infra 
Partlll.L. 
34. VA. CODE.ANN.§ 55-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
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date provision, it may be found to be applicable only to estates 
created after June 30, 1999.35 In addition to adding new section 
55-20.1, the 1999 Session amended section 55-9 to provide that 
either spouse may be the conveyor creating their tenancy by the 
entirety in realty or personalty, 36 and also amended section 55-21 to 
provide that the intent to create such a tenancy "shall be manifest 
from a designation of a husband and his wife as 'tenants by the 
entireties' or 'tenants by the entirety. '"37 A possible problem with the 
amendment to section 55-21, giving illustrative language that would 
show the requisite intent, is the fact that this section continues to 
require such intent to be found in the "instrument" in question, and 
the Supreme Court of Virginia has held that promissory notes are 
not within the word "instrument" as used in section 55-21.38 
F. Augmented Estate-Separate Property 
The purpose of the augmented estate's separate property exclusion 
is to prevent a surviving spouse from obtaining any benefit based 
upon the decedent's interest in property gratuitously received from 
anyone other than the surviving spouse. 39 In order to make this 
35. The argument for retroactive application of section 55-20.1 will be found in the 
discussion of the amendments to section 55-9, infra note 36. 
36. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-9 (Cum. Supp. 1999). This section already contained an 
effective date provision stating that "[a]ll such deeds made prior to July 1, 1986, are validated 
notwithstanding defects in the form thereof which do not affect vested rights." Id. § 55-9 
(Repl. Vol. 1995). In addition to the action noted in the text, the 1999 amendments to section 
55-9 also replaced the word "deeds" in this sentence with the word "conveyances" and, as 
amended, this entire section is reenacted. See id. § 55-9 (Cum. Supp. 1999). The better view 
would suggest that the amendment and reenactment of the effective date provision in section 
55-9, which occurred in pari materia with the enactment of new section 55-20.1, shows a 
legislative intent that section 55-20.1 should be treated the same way, i.e., retroactively, 
except to the extent that such retroactivity would affect vested rights. See id. §§ 55·9, -20.1 
(Cum. Supp. 1999). 
37. Id. § 55-21 (Cum. Supp. 1999). This language is clearly intended to be interpreted as 
illustrative and not mandatory. Thus a designation such as "ATBE," found in In re Massey, 
225 B.R. 887 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998), commented on in Part III.L., infra, should be recognized 
as sufficient under this section. For further discussion, sec infra Part III.L. 
38. See Pitts v. United States, 242 Va. 254, 260, 408 S.E.2d 901, 904 (1991). 
39. The separate property provision specifically excludes 
(ii) the value of any property, its income or proceeds, received by the 
decedent by gift, will, or intestate succession, before or during the 
marriage to the surviving spouse, from a person other than the surviving 
spouse to the extent such property, income, or proceeds were maintained 
by the decedent as separate property. 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-16.1 (first unnumbered paragraph following subsection C3Xd), prior to 
the 1999 amendment) (Repl. Vol. 1995). Note: a further convenience added to this section by 
the 1999 legislation is the numbering or lettering of every paragraph, which will eliminate 
the necessity for awkward citations such as the one contained in the preceding sentence. See 
id. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
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exclusion applicable to every conceivable gratuitous transfer, the 
original legislation referred to property received by (i) "will or 
intestate succession" to inclµde all probate transfers, and (ii) the 
generic term "gift" to comprehensively include all other gratuitous 
transfers.40 A concern developed in recent years, however, that an 
attorney or judge who is not learned in estate and property law 
matters might give the word "gift" a more narrow construction than 
was intended by the General Assembly. To prevent such an error 
from occurring, the separate property exclusion is amended by 
adding additional language declaratory of existing law as follows: 
"gift, will, intestate succession, or any other method or form of trans-
fer to the extent it is received without full consideration in money or 
money's worth."41 
G. Augmented Estate-Valuation of Survivorship Property 
Although nonseparate survivorship property has always been 
subject to inclusion in a decedent's augmented estate under section 
64.1-16.1, the Virginia Code has contained no rules for the valuation 
of such property interests. A new paragraph added to this section in 
1999 replaces this vacuum with a collection of valuation rules that, 
except in two instances, are believed to be declaratory of original 
intent and existing practice. 42 One of the two new rules provides that 
tenancy by the entirety property will be valued the same as a joint 
tenancy with the right of survivorship and the other provides that 
joint property owned by persons married to each other "shall be 
rebuttably presumed to have been acquired with contributions of 
equal value by each tenant."43 
H. Joint Accounts in Financial Institutions-Disclosure 
The longstanding issue of a decedent's intent regarding survivor-
ship in joint accounts in banks, savings and loan associations, and 
credit unions led to the complete reform of the laws applicable to all 
nonbusiness multiple-party accounts, in 1979, and their restatement 
as one set of rules applicable to all such accounts in any financial 
institution. 44 One of the innovations of this reform was section 
40. See id. § 64.l-16.1(3)(d)(ii) (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
41. Id. § 64.1-16.l(BXii) (Cum. Supp. 1999) (emphasis added). 
42. See id. § 64.1-16.l(C)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
43. Id. 
44. See Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 407, 1979 Va. Acts 596 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§§ 6.1-125.1 to -125.16 (Repl. Vol. 1999)). The background of this legislation may be 
found in J. Rodney Johnson, Joint, Totten Trust, and P.0.D Bank Accounts; Virginia Law 
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6.1-125.15, which provided that every financial institution offering 
joint accounts "shall" offer its depositors two differently labeled 
alternatives: "JOINT ACCOUNT WITH SURVIVORSHIP" and 
"JOINT ACCOUNT-NO SURVIVORSHIP."45 The1999 amend-ment 
to section 6.1-125.15 continues further down this same path by 
providing that financial institutions "shall" also add certain 
disclosure language to these labels, effective July 1, 2000.46 
Though well-intentioned, the 1999 disclosure requirement suffers 
from the same defect as the 1979 label requirement. Although both 
of them state that financial institutions "shall" take the required 
steps, there is no enforcement mechanism or penalty for failure to 
comply, and twenty years after the label requirement became 
effective, anecdotal evidence indicates that all financial institutions 
have not yet complied. 47 With all due respect, one wonders about the 
efficacy of this disclosure language to accomplish the desired result. 
It is submitted that the meanings of the terms "survivorship" and 
"non-survivorship" are known to the average bank customer. If this 
is true, it would appear that a problem exists today because (i) the 
financial institution is not labeling the forms as required by existing 
law, or (ii) the depositor is not reading the labels that are provided. 
Personal experience suggests that the latter is the more likely 
reason, but if either is true, the mandating of more language to be 
ignored (whether by a financial institution or its customers) will not 
solve the problem. 
Compared to the Uniform Probate Code, 8 U. RICH. L. REv. 41 (1973). 
Id. 
45. VA. CODE.ANN.§ 6.l-125.15(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999). 
46. See id. § 6.1-125.15(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999). The amendment provides in part: 
Disclosure in a form substantially similar to the following shall 
satisfy the requirements of this section: 
Joint Account With Survivorship-On the death of a party to the 
account, the deceased party's ownership in the account passes to 
the surviving party or parties to the account. 
Joint Account-No Survivorship-On the death of a party to the 
account, the deceased party's ownership in the account passes as 
a part of the party's estate under the party's will, trust [sic], or by 
intestacy. 
47. The recent case of Patterson v. Patterson, 257 Va. 558, 515 S.E.2d 113 (1999), noted 
in Part III.K, infra, is of some relevance at this point. In this case Husband (using Wife's 
funds) opened a $100,000 account with Wife, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, 
at a Richmond bank 19 days before Wife's death in 1995. See Patterson, 257 Va. at 560, 515 
S.E.2d at 114. There was no evidence in the record that Wife was even aware that the bank 
had allowed Husband to open this joint account, and it was clear that she did not sign a 
signature card. See id. 
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I. Succession-Paternity-Illegitimacy-Exhumation-Evidence 
Section 32.1-286,48 dealing with exhumations, was amended in 
1997 to empower the circuit court to order disinterment for the 
purpose of genetic testing to establish a biological relationship in 
succession matters "[u]pon the presentation of substantial evidence 
by a moving party that he will prevail in his attempt."49 The 1999 
amendment to this section (i) strikes the above quoted "substantial 
evidence" requirement, and (ii) states the opposite: "[t]his 
provision . . . shall not require substantive proof of parentage to 
obtain the exhumation order."50 It is believed that most of such 
exhumations will arise in the context of illegitimacy, and the bill 
that made the above amendment also made minor amendments to 
two statutes dealing with proof of paternity when illegitimacy is 
involved.51 
J. Boilerplate Powers-Custodial Trust-Incapacitated Person 
The statutory boilerplate fiduciary powers in section 64.1-57 were 
amended, in 1992, by the addition of a power to make distribution 
for an incapacitated beneficiary to a custodial trustee under the 
Uniform Custodial TrustAct.52 However, this 1992 amendment did 
not clearly state what definition of "incapacitated" would control for 
the purpose of this remedy: the standard "adjudicated" definition 
found in guardianship and conservatorship law,53 or the special 
"functional" definition found in the Uniform Custodial Trust Act. 54 · 
48. VA. ConEANN. § 32.1-286 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
49. Id. § 32.1-286(C) (Repl. Vol. 1997). The background and scope of this development is 
discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 
31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1249, 1262-63 (1997). 
50. VA. CODE ANN.§ 32.1-286(C) (Cum. Supp.1999). 
51. The section dealing with the meaning of child and related terms was amended by 
adding a reference to "scientifically reliable genetic testing." Id. § 64.l-5.1(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 
1999). The section dealing with evidence of paternity was amended by (i) changing"medically 
reliable genetic blood grouping tests" to "scientifically reliable genetic tests, including DNA 
tests," and (ii) adding a reference to "scientific" to the previously referenced "medical and 
anthropological evidence." Id. § 64.1-5.2(7), (8) (Cum. Supp. 1999). The interaction of these 
two statutes was before the supreme court in Jones v. Eley, 256 Va. 198, 501 S.E.2d 405 
(1998), noted infra Part lli.D. 
52. Act of Mar. 31, 1992, ch. 584, 1992 Va. Acts 780 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 64.1-57(1)(p) (Repl. Vol. 1995)). The significance of this development is discussed in 
J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 26 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 873, 892 (1992). 
53. See VA. ConEANN. § 37.1-134.6 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
54. See id. § 55-34.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
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The 1999 amendment to section 64.1-57 confirms the latter, 
functional, definition to be the one intended.55 
K Judicial Grant of Boilerplate Powers-Inter Vivos Trust- Venue 
Section 64.1-57.156 was added to the Virginia Code in 1976 to 
permit a circuit court to grant the boilerplate fiduciary powers found 
in section 64.1-5757 to a decedent's personal representative.58 This 
section was amended in 1985 to clarify that the term "personal 
representative" included the administrator of an intestate estate;59 
and again in 1988 to extend the scope of the section to trustees of 
testamentary and inter vivos trusts. 60 The 1988 extension created a 
procedural problem, however, because the statute's original 
language directed any fiduciary seeking the grant of these powers 
"to the circuit court in which he is qualified,"-yet the trustee of an 
inter vivos trust does not qualify in any court.61 The 1999 amend-
ment eliminates this problem by providing for venue in such cases 
to be in "the circuit court for the jurisdiction in which the grantor 
resides or resided at the time of his death, a trustee resides or a 
corporate trustee has an office. "62 
L. Estate Tax-Marital Deduction-QTIP Election by Trustee 
The Internal Revenue Code was amended, effective January 1, 
1982, to create an estate tax marital deduction for the estate of a 
married person who left a gift of "qualified terminable interest 
property" to the surviving spouse. 63 One of the requirements for 
obtaining this deduction is that the decedent's "executor" make a 
specific election on the estate tax return of the decedent's estate.64 
In response to this new option, the 1982 Session added section 
64.1-57.2 to the Code, to authorize a "personal representative" to 
make the required election for qualified gifts passing to a surviving 
spouse by will or inter vivos trust. 65 The 1999 Session, responding to 
55. See id. § 64.l-57(1)(p) (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
56. Id. § 64.1-57.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
57. Id. § 64.1-57 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
58. See Act of Apr. 3, 1976, ch. 437, 1976 Va. Acts 509. 
59. See Act of Mar. 17, 1985, ch. 345, 1976 Va. Acts 394. 
60. See Act of Mar. 29, 1988, ch. 345, 1988 Va. Acts 416. 
61. Id. 
62. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-57.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
63. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1986). 
64. See id. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) (1986). 
65. See Act of Apr. 11, 1982, ch. 551, 1982 Acts 945. This Act also made a parallel 
amendment to the boilerplate powers statute at VA. CODE ANN. section 64.1-57(1)(s). Section 
64.1-57.2 was amended the following year to provide for the finality of a good faith election. 
1999] WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 1087 
a concern arising where the decedent's estate plan is based upon an 
inter vivos trust and where there may not be a "personal representa-
tive" because there will be no probate estate, amended the statute 
to provide in such cases that "[a]s used in this section, the term 
'personal representative' shall include the trustee of a qualified 
terminable interest property trust."66 
M. Durable Power of Attorney-Non-Judicial Accounting 
The 1995 General Assembly responded to a concern for certain 
victims of financial exploitation by enacting, among other remedies, 
section 11-9.6 that provides for a nonjudicial accounting of the 
activities of an agent under a durable power of attorney for a two-
year period. 67 The 1999 Session amended this section to provide that, 
if the principal dies before a request is made, (i) the request must be 
made within one year of the death, and (ii) the two-year period of the 
accounting begins at the time of death instead of the time of the 
request.68 
N. Decedent's Estates-Funeral Expenses 
Section 64.1-136.1, largely declaratory of existing law, was added 
to the Code by the 1999 Session at the request of the Virginia 
Bankers Association. 69 This section provides that a decedent's 
reasonable funeral and burial expenses are an obligation of the 
decedent's estate, and that the estate is liable therefore to "(i) the 
funeral establishment, (ii) the cemetery, (iii) any third-party creditor 
who finances the payment of such expenses, or (iv) any person 
authorized to make arrangements for the funeral of the decedent 
who has paid such expenses."70 However, a possible problem may be 
created by this new statute when a person borrows from a bank to 
pay a decedent's funeral expenses, uses the borrowed funds for that 
purpose, obtains reimbursement from the decedent's personal 
representative for the funeral expenses so paid and then, after 
expending these funds for private purposes, is unable to repay the 
See Act of Mar. 10, 1983, ch. 54, 1983 Va. Acts 61. 
66. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-57.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
67. See Act of Mar. 18, 1995, ch. 369, 1995 Va. Acts 522. The background and operation 
of this remedy is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Suruey of Virginia Law: Wills, 
Trusts, and Estates, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1175, 1176-77 (1995). 
68. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 11-9.6 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
69. See id.§ 64.1-136.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
70. Id. This provision is expressly made subject to VA. CODE ANN. section 64.1-157 (Cum. 
Supp. 1999), which, in insolvent estates, makes funeral expenses a priority-three claim, 
subject to a $2,000 limitation. See id. 
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creditor bank. In this case the literal language of part (iii) of the new 
statute creates a direct liability of the decedent's estate to "any 
third-party creditor who finances the payment of such expenses,~71 
and it may also have introduced some uncertainty into the law and 
practice of fiduciary administration. 
0. Fiduciary Accounting-Federal Benefits Excluded 
With one exception, every court-appointed fiduciary_ of another's 
property who qualifies in the clerk's office is required to file an 
annual accounting with the commissioner of accounts detailing all 
receipts and disbursements during the accounting period. 72 However 
no provision of Virginia law requires a representative payee73 who 
receives only federal source benefits 74 on behalf of another to account 
for the same before the commissioner.75 It has been unclear, 
however, whether a fiduciary who was required to make an account-
ing because of other income or property, and who was also serving 
as a representative payee for the same beneficiary, had to also 
include any federal source benefits in the required accounting. A 
1999 amendment to section 26-17.10 ends this uncertainty by 
providing that "no accounting to the commissioner shall be required 
of [federal source] benefits paid to a designated representative on 
behalf of the recipient if the representative is otherwise required to 
account for such benefits. "76 Although no detailed accounting will 
now be required in connection with federal source benefits, the 1999 
amendment goes on to provide that a fiduciary who is required to 
71. Id. § 64.1-136.l(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
72. See id. § 26-17.3 (Repl. Vol. 1997). One exception is made for testamentary trusts 
created in wills probated after July 1, 1993, in which the testator has expressly waived the 
trustee's duty to account. See id.§ 26-17.7 (Repl. Vol. 1997). 
73. "Representative payee" is a federal law term identifying a person who receives federal 
source benefits on behalf of another who is unable to manage the benefits because ofa mental 
condition, a physical condition, or youth. See, for example, in connection with Social Security 
benefits, 20 C.F.R. § 404.2001 (1998). 
74. The primary federal source benefits are Social Security, supplemental security 
income, and Veteran's benefits. 
75. The representative payee of such benefits may be subject to an obligation to account 
therefore to some agency of the federal government. For example, the SOCIAL SECURITY 
AnMIN., PUB. No. 65-008, SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK (13th ed. 1997), provides in part that 
"[a]n annual report form (Representative Payee Report) is sent to representative payees for 
them to explain how Social Security benefits or SSI payments were managed during the 
12-month report period .... Depending on the payee's responses, SSA may have to interview 
the payee and complete a more detailed report (Representative Payee Evaluation Report) in 
order to determine the continued suitability of the representative payee." Id. at§ 1622. 
76. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-17.lO(C) ~Cum. Supp. 1999). 
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account under Virginia law "shall disclose thereon the total amount 
of such (federal source) benefits received during the accounting 
period."77 The purpose of this single entry disclosure is to enable the 
commissioner to determine the total resources available to a 
beneficiary from all sources, so that the commissioner might know 
how much, if any, of the beneficiary's other assets might need to be 
expended to provide for a beneficiary who is also receiving federal 
source benefits during the accounting period. 
P. Fiduciary Accounting-Corporate Affidavits-Check Copies 
Section 26-17.9, dealing with the· vouchers or receipts required to 
support expenditures in a fiduciary accounting before the commis-
sioner of accounts, was the subject of two 1999 amendments 
requested by the Virginia Bankers Association.78 The first amend-
ment, expressly restricted to corporate fiduciaries, allows them to 
submit one affidavit attesting to all of their disbursements for debts, 
taxes, and expenses, instead of having to submit a separate receipt 
or voucher for each disbursement.79 The second amendment, 
ostensibly available to all fiduciaries, allows them to use a front-and-
back copy of a check as a voucher or receipt, instead of having to 
submit the original check to the commissioner, if the "copy was made 
in the regular course of business in accordance with the admissibil-
ity requirements of§ 8.01-391."80 However this apparent relaxation 
of the "no copy of a check" rule will be unavailable to the typical 
fiduciary because of the "regular course of business" limitations 
imposed by the reference to section 8.01-391.81 
Q. Fiduciary Administration-Technical & Procedural 
Amendments 
In response to a request of the Standing Committee on Commis-
sioners of Accounts of the Judicial Council of Virginia, the 1999 
Session made the following technical or procedural amendments: (1) 
the words "guardians of minor's estates" were added to the statute 
imposing the accounting requirement on fiduciaries for incapacitated 
persons;82 (2) erroneous references to "§ 26-17" were changed to 
77. Id. 
78. See id.§ 26-17.9 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
79. See id. 
80. Id.§ 26-17.9(E) (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
81. See id. 
82. Id.§ 26-17.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999). This provision was inadvertently omitted in the 
1997 reform of the laws applicable to guardians of adults. 
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"§ 26-17 .3" in the statute dealing with forfeiture of fiduciary 
commissions, 83 and in the statute permitting three-year accountings 
in small estates;84 and (3) the statute dealing with the commissioner 
of accounts' enforcement procedure when a fiduciary fails to account 
was revised. 85 
R Federal Estate Tax-Conservation Easement Exclusion 
Section 2031 of the Internal Revenue Code,86 which defines the 
concept of the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes, provides 
for a limited exclusion from taxation for land subject to a qualified 
conservation easement if, among other things, the estate's executor 
makes the appropriate election.87 The necessity of this election 
presents no problem where all of the estate's beneficiaries are 
competent, consenting adults. The problem presented by the 
inability of other beneficiaries to consent to such an election by the 
executor (or by the trustee where the property is in a trust) is 
addressed by the 1999 Session's creation of new section 64.1-57.3 
that authorizes the circuit court to give this consent "on behalf of 
any unborn, unascertained or incapacitated heirs, beneficiaries and 
devisees whose interests are affected thereby."88 
S. Charitable Trusts-Shares of Professional Entities 
This 1999 legislation authorizes the transfer of shares in profes-
sional corporations and membership interests in limited liability 
companies to a "qualified charitable remainder trust," if certain 
conditions are met. 89 
T. Fiduciary Administration-Multistate Trust Institutions Act 
This lengthy legislation, the Multistate Trust Institutions Act,90 
was enacted by the 1999 Session "to enable and promote the 
83. See id. § 26-19 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
84. See id. § 26-20 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
85. See id. § 26-18 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
86. I.R.C. § 2031 (1968). 
87. See id. § 2031(c). 
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57.3 (Cum. Supp. 1999). This statute provides that a guardian 
ad !item must be appointed to represent such persons, and the court must find that "(i) the 
donation of the conservation easement will not adversely affect such heirs, beneficiaries or 
devisees or (ii) it is more likely than not that such heirs, beneficiaries or devisees would 
consent if they were before the court and capable of giving consent." Id. 
89. Act of Mar. 15, 1999, ch. 100, 1999 Va. Acts 126 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§§ 13.1-550, -552, -1115, -1117 (Cum. Supp. 1999)). 
90. Act of Mar. 29, 1999, ch. 835, 1999 Va. Acts 1516 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§§ 6.1-32.31 to -32.45 (Cum. Supp. 1999)). 
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establishment of trust offices in other states by Virginia banks, trust 
companies and trust subsidiaries, and to permit out-of-state trust 
institutions, including without limitation national banks whose 
home state is other than Virginia, to engage in the trust business in 
this state."91 
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
A Charitable Entity-Standing of Attorney General 
Tauber v. Commonwealth92 involved the disposition of assets 
located in Virginia that belonged to a Maryland charitable corpora-
tion in dissolution. 93 To the claimed error of the trial court in 
allowing the Virginia Attorney General to bring this case, the 
supreme court responded that it had "long ago recognized the 
common law authority of the Attorney General to act on behalf of the 
public in matters involving charitable assets."94 
B. Contracts to Make a Will 
In Runion v. Helvesting,95 the trial court sustained a demurrer to 
plaintiffs' claim of an oral contract for a devise of certain real estate, 
and for a purchase option on other real estate, that were both bas~d 
upon plaintiffs' promise to provide long-term care for the property 
owner.96 Applying the "well-established" requirements for the 
enforcement of such oral contracts to the facts that were admitted 
for purposes of the demurrer,97the case was reversed and remanded 
for a trial on the merits. 98 
C. Future Interests-Vested or Contingent Remainder 
In Coleman v. Coleman, 99 testatrix devised certain real estate to 
S for life, and also left a remainder in one-half of the same real 
estate to S (by way of the residuary clause in testatrix's will).100 S 
survived testatrix and there was no condition of survivorship 
91. VA. CODE ANN.§ 6.1-32.31(B) (Cum. Supp.1999). 
92. 255 Va. 445, 499 S.E.2d 839 (1998). 
93. See id. at 448, 499 S.E.2d at 840. 
94. Id. at451, 499 S.E.2dat842 (citingClarkv. Oliver, 91Va.421, 427-28, 22 S.E.175, 
177 (1895)). 
95. 256 Va. 1, 501S.E.2d411 (1998). 
96. See id at 3, 501 S.E.2d at 412. 
97. Id. at 6, 501 S.E.2d at 414 (quoting Wright v. Puckett, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 370 (1872)). 
98. See id. at 10, 501 S.E.2d at 415-16. 
99. 256 Va. 64, 500 S.E.2d 507 (1998). 
100. See id. at 65, 500 S.E.2d at 508. 
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expressed in testatrix's wiU.101 Nevertheless, the trial court held that 
S's remainder in this real estate was a contingent remainder that 
failed upon her death because S "did not possess a 'present capacity' 
to take her residuary interest upon termination of the prior life 
estate. "102 The Supreme Court of Virginia referring to the early 
vesting rule as "a firmly established principle of will construction in 
Virginia, "103 reversed and entered final judgment that S's remainder 
interest vested absolutely in S at testatrix's death.104 
D. Intestate Succession-Illegitimacy-Clear and Convincing 
Evidence 
Section 64.1-5.1 of the Code, 105 which replaced its unconstitutional 
predecessor in 1978,1°6 marks the beginning of illegitimate succes-
sion through males in Virginialaw.107 As introduced, that legislation 
contained a simple "clear and convincing evidence" test for establish-
ing paternity. However, a fear of spurious paternity claims in those 
pre-DNA days led the General Assembly to restrict this test to "clear 
and convincing evidence as set forth in § 64.1-5.2."108 Section 
64.1-5.2,109 created expressly for this purpose, contained a listing of 
six exclusive evidences of paternity that were taken from then 
existing section 20-61.1 (used for determining paternity for child 
support purposes), which was declared unconstitutional in 1984.110 
IBtimately recognizing that this same unconstitutional taint also 
infected section 64.1-5.2, the 1991 Session rather dramatically 
amended it by reversing the introductory language preceding the 
listed evidences from "shall be limited to" to "may include, but shall 
not be limited to. "m 
101. See id. 
102. Id. This unique future interests analysis was not further discussed as there was 
neither brief nor argument for appellees in the supreme court. See id. 
103. Id. at 66, 500 S.E.2d at 508. 
104. See id at 67, 500 S.E.2d at 509. 
105. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
106. See id. § 64.1-5 (repealed in 1978). 
107. See id.§ 64.1-5.l (Cum. Supp. 1999). The background of this development is discussed 
in J. Rodney Johnson, Inheritance Rights of Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 275 
(1978). 
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.l-5.1(3)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1995). This is still the language ofV A. CODE 
ANN. § 64.l-5.1(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
109. Id. § 64.1-5.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
110. See Jones v. Robinson, 229 Va. 276, 287, 329 S.E.2d 794, 802 (1985). This 
development is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey ofVirginiaLaw: Wills, Trusts, 
and Estates, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 779, 792-94 (1985). 
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995). This development is discussed in J. 
Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 25 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 925, 925-27 (1991). 
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In this context, the supreme court in a four to three decision in 
Jones v. Eley,112 concluded that the trial court's factual determina-
tion that petitioners were the decedent's illegitimate children was 
supported by clear and convincing · evidence. 113 In addition to 
disagreeing with the majority based upon the evidence presented, 
the dissenting opinion refers several times to the fact that none of 
the factors mentioned in section 64.1-5.2 were proven.114 In light of 
this section's tortured history (which the dissent does not indicate 
was called to its attention), however, this concern would not appear 
to be justified.115 
E. Deed of Gift-Rescission 
InAyers v. Mosby,116 testatrix's executors, who were also devisees 
of a half-interest in certain real estate under her will, sought to 
rescind testatrix's deed of gift to this same realty, executed eighteen 
months prior to the will in question, based on allegations of mutual 
mistake of fact or coercion. 117 No new issues of law were presented: 
"[t]he facts are virtually undisputed; the controversy is over the 
inferences to be drawn from the facts."118 After reviewing the facts, 
the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the chancellor's award of 
summary judgment to the defendant.119 
112. 256 Va. 198, 501 S.E.2d 405 (1998). 
113. See id. at 201, 501 S.E.2d at 408. 
114. See id. at 204-05, 501 S.E.2d at 708-09 (Koontz, J., dissenting). 
115. See id. (Koontz, J., dissenting). 
116. 256 Va. 228, 504 S.E.2d 845 (1998). 
117. See id. at 229, 504 S.E.2d at 846. 
118. Id. at 230, 504 S.E.2d at 846. 
119. See id. at 235, 504 S.E.2d at 849. In the course of its opinion the supreme court 
noted that 
To carry out her plan to dispose of her assets in order to qualify for 
Medicaid funding, the decedent intentionally transferred the fee simple 
interest in her real property to defendant so that he could "take care" 
of her. There was no mistake on her part; she accomplished just what 
she intended, that is, to liquidate her assets but have them remain 
available for support during her life. 
Id. at 234, 504 S.E.2d at 848. There is no mention of any possible fraudulent intent 
motivating the decedent in this transaction or the impact, if any, that such an intent might 
have on the transfer in question. 
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F. Trustee's Implied Power to Grant Purchase Option 
The primary issue in Ward v. Nations bank of Virginia, N.A. 120 was 
whether a trustee breached its fiduciary duty by granting a purchase 
option over the trust's real estate when the trust document, which 
did not expressly confer a power upon the Trustee to grant such an 
option, did contain an express power to sell real estate.121 The trial 
court relied upon the Restatement of Trusts forthe common-law rule 
that "'[ w ]here by the terms of a trust a power of sale is conferred 
upon the trustee, it is ordinarily not proper for the trustee to give an 
option to purchase property.'"122 The supreme court held that the 
trial court erred on this point because the claimed option power was 
not based solely upon the power to sell, but was instead to be found 
implied from the settlors' intent, the language of the trust agree-
ment, and the purpose of the trust. 123 In this latter regard the 
supreme court referred to traditio]1.al boilerplate language in the 
trust instrument stating that the trustee might 
do all other acts and things not inconsistent with [the trust agreement 
which the trustee] may deem necessary or desirable for the proper 
management [of the trust] in the same manner and to the same extent 
as an individual might or could do with respect to his own property .124 
Immediately following this quotation, the supreme court's opinion 
states that "[a]ny reasonable interpretation of this language would 
include the ability of the Trustee to grant an option to purchase."125 
This rather absolute statement, instead of the ejusdem generis 
interpretation that one might have anticipated, gives significantly 
more impact to a standard form-book provision than one might have 
expected, and if this is what the court intends, attorneys will need 
to exercise correspondingly greater care when drafting trust 
agreements in the future. There is some question concerning the 
court's meaning, however, because immediately after saying "[a]ny 
reasonable interpretation . . . would include," the decision states 
"[t]herefore, we must determine whether an option to purchase is 
120. 256 Va. 427, 507 S.E.2d 616 (1998). 
121. See id. at 431-32, 507 S.E.2d at 618. Other issues that were decided within the 
framework of existing law were (i) good faith exercise of a fiduciary power, (ii) removal of a 
trustee, and (iii) award of attorney's fees to a trustee. See id. at 434-41, 507 S.E.2d at 621-25. 
122. Id. at 434, 507 S.E.2d at 620 (quoting from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 190 
cmt. k (1959)). 
123. See id. at 434-35, 507 S.E.2d at 620-21. 
124. Id. at 435, 507 S.E.2d at 621. 
125. Id. 
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appropriate or necessary to carry out the purpose of the trust. "126 
This factual determination was resolved in the affirmative. 127 
G. Joint Investment Account-Presumption of Surviuorship-
Survivorship 
In Buck u. Jordan, 128 Father and Daughter opened a joint 
investment account with Investment Corporation that was funded 
with $100,000 supplied by Father and titled as "Joint Tenants with 
Rights of Survivorship and not as tenants in common or as tenants 
by the entirety" based upon a form signed by Father and 
Daughter.129 In an action brought to determine ownership of this 
account following Father's death, the trial court held for daughter 
because the language of this form was "'clear, unambiguous, and 
unequivocal and sufficient to rebut the presumption, to which the 
trial court referred, that the account was opened solely as conve-
nience to [Father ].'"130 The presumption that this investment account 
was opened for the convenience of Father (because he supplied the 
funds), to which the trial court referred, is also recognized by the 
supreme court at two places in its opinion.131 However, the only 
authority cited by the supreme court for this presumption involves 
deposit accounts in financial institutions (banks, savings and loan 
associations, and credit unions) wherein, the supreme court 
126. Id. at 435-36, 507 S.E.2d at 621. 
127. See id. at 442, 507 S.E.2d at 625. 
128. 256 Va. 535, 508 S.E.2d 880 (1998). 
129. Id. at 537-38, 508 S.E.2d at 881. The form that Father and Daughter signed "further 
provided that '[i]n the event of the death of either or any of the undersigned, the entire 
interest in the Joint Account shall be vested in the survivor ... . "'Id. at 538 n.l, 508 S.E.2d 
at 881 n.1. This additional language approximates the disclosure language mandated by the 
1999 Session of the General Assembly for joint accounts in financial institutions (effective 
July 1, 1999) that is intended to make the parties to such accounts aware of the consequences 
of the term ".joint tenants with the right of survivorship." See supra Part II.H. Interestingly, 
when Father had another person telephone Investment Corporation to inquire about the form 
and consequences of the investment account in this case, (i) the first responder stated that 
the account was owned as ".joint tenants in common ... [meaning that] 'if one passes away 
the Estate of that individual will receive that half and the other living party will get half,"' 
Buck, 256 Va. at 539, 508 S.E.2d at 881-82; (ii) in a later call a second responder stated "'if one 
passes away •.. the survivor gets 100 percent of the account,"' id.; and (iii) in a final call to 
the first responder that person replied that the second responder "'has no knowledge on this 
account whatsoever,"' id.; and repeated the original response that it was owned by Father and 
Daughter as tenants in common. See id. 
130. Id. at 540, 508 S.E.2d at 882. 
131. See id. at 537-38, 542-43, 508 S.E.2d at 881, 883-84. 
1096 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1075 
recognizes, it was abolished in 1980, 132 and the present case involves 
an investment account with an investment company.133 
If this "presumption ofconvenience," formerly applicable to deposit 
accounts in financial institutions, 134 is to now be the rule for 
investment accounts with investment corporations, logically it must 
also be applied to investment accounts with brokerage houses, 
mutual funds, etc. Accordingly, this case is of great significance for 
the investment community and it may also signal a need for some 
form of legislation because of the potential confusion that will now 
exist in the investment marketplace. Take, for instance, the case 
where a consumer goes into a bank and opens a $50,000 deposit 
account at desk number one (with an employee of the bank) and then 
opens a $50,000 investment account at desk number two (with an 
employee of the bank's separately chartered investment company ).135 
One can argue that a presumption of convenience should be 
applicable to both accounts, or to neither account, but it is submit-
ted, one cannot argue for such a presumption to be applicable at 
desk number two but not at desk number one. Going a bit further 
down this same road, it might be noted that the larger issue is 
further confused by the fact that, although a presumption of 
convenience now exists for joint "investment accounts," such a 
presumption apparently does not exist for individual joint "invest-
ments" themselves.136 
Coming back to the case at hand, the supreme court noted that 
although the common-law rule of survivorship betweenjoint tenants 
has been abolished in Virginia, there is an exception in cases where 
"it manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument that it was 
intended the part of the one dying should belong to the others."137 In 
this matter of first impression, the court held that this statutory 
132. See id. at 542 n.5, 508 S.E.2d at 884 n.5. 
133. See id. 
134. For a discussion of the presumption of convenience as formerly applicable to joint 
accounts in financial institutions, see Johnson, supra note 44. 
135. The investment account in the present case was opened with Sovran Investment 
Corporation. See Buck, 256 Va. at 538, 508 S.E.2d at 881. 
136. In Wrenn v. Daniels, 200 Va. 419, 106 S.E.2d 126 (1958), "[c]ounsel for complainant 
... contend that no such presumption [of convenience] exists with regard to the transfer of 
shares of stock to a form of joint ownership. . . . Counsel for defendant agree with that 
statement oflaw," and the supreme court appears to also agree. Id. at 426-27, 106 S.E.2d at 
131. This result would appear to strengthen the suggestion made in the text for legislation 
to develop a consistent body of rules for jointly held assets, regardless of the form or nature 
of the property or entity involved. 
137. Id. at 542, 508 S.E.2d at 883 (quoting VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-21 (Repl. Vol. 1995)). 
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exception was applicable to the investment account in the present 
case, and after examining the "tenor of the instrument" signed by 
Father and Daughter, affirmed the trial court decision in favor of 
Daughter.138 
H. Promissory Notes-Joint Tenancy-Ownership-Survivorship 
In Zink v. Stafford, 139 Father sold parcels of real estate to four 
persons, taldng back promissory notes in three cases that were made 
to "Father and Daughter or the survivor," and in the other case 
made to him individually but later endorsed over to "Father or 
Daughter or the survivor."140 Daughter claimed these promissory 
notes after Father's death on the basis that, pursuant to section 
55-21, "the tenor of the instrument" showed a clear intent for 
survivorship.141 However, one of Father's intestate successors argued 
that Daughter's survivorship issue would not arise unless she could 
first establish an ownership interest in these notes.142 The supreme 
court agreed and, although noting that the form of titling is 
ordinarily prima facie evidence of ownership, concluded on the facts 
of the case that Father never intended to make any lifetime gift to 
Daughter.143 Instead, "the survivorship language on each note was 
an abortive testamentary act and not a gift. "144 
I. Will Contest-Person Interested-Object of Power of Appointment 
In Martone v. Martone, 145 the trial court upheld testator's 1995 will 
in a proceeding in which testator's beneficiary and all of his heirs 
138. See id. at 542, 508 S.E.2d at 883. 
139. 257 Va. 46, 509 S.E.2d 833 (1999). 
140. Id. at 49, 509 S.E.2d at 834. 
141. Id. at48, 509 S.E.2d 833-34. In this regard Daughter sought to distinguish the present 
case from Pitts v. United States, 242 Va. 254, 408 S.E.2d 901 (1991), wherein the supreme 
court held that promissory notes were not within the word "instrument" as used in section 
55-21. See id. at 260, 408 S.E.2d at 904. 
142. See Zink, 257 Va. at 50, 509 S.E.2d at 835. 
143. See id. at 51, 509 S.E.2d at 835. 
144. Id. at 51, 509 S.E.2d at 836. Without disagreeing with this quote as an accurate 
statement of existing law, one might nevertheless ask why this has to be so. Had the 
language in question been on four bank accounts (debts owed by a bank) instead of on four 
promissory notes (debts owed by individuals) the result would have been different. If Father's 
intent for Daughter to have these funds foIIowing his death is clear, should a matter of form 
control the substance and frustrate this intent? The provisions of article 6, section 101 of the 
Uniform Probate Code, entitled "Nonprobate Transfers on Death," offers a statutory vehicle 
for addressing cases such as this. "The sole purpose of this section is to prevent the transfers 
authorized here from being treated as testamentary." UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 6-101, cmt. 
(amended 1989), 8 U.L.A. 431 (1969). 
145. 257 Va. 199, 509 S.E.2d 302 (1999). 
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were joined as parties. 146 Thereafter a grandchild, whose parent was 
a party in the prior proceeding, brought an action attacking the 1995 
will and seeking to establish testator's 1991 will.147 The grandchild 
claimed to not be bound by the prior proceeding for lack of being a 
party, and further claimed standing to contest the 1995 will as a 
"person interested" under the 1991 will, a term not previously 
defined in Virginia law.148 In responding to this issue of first 
impression, the supreme court held that to be a "person interested," 
"an individual must have a legally ascertainable pecuniary interest, 
which will be impaired by probating a will or benefitted by setting 
aside the will, and not a mere expectancy."149 The grandchild's 
claimed pecuniary interest under the 1991 will was based on a 
power granted to testator's executor over net income during the 
period of administration to (i) distribute within a class of objects 
composed of testator's spouse and issue, (ii) accumulate and add to 
the residuary estate, or (iii) apply to estate obligations. 150 The 
supreme court concluded that the grandchild's interest as a member 
of the class defined as testator's "issue" under (i) "is a mere expec-
tancy, not a legally ascertainable right. It is, therefore, not sufficient 
to satisfy the requirement of a 'person interested' under Virginia 
Code§ 64.1-90."151 
J. Tenancy by the Entirety-Separate Judgments by Same Creditor 
The question in Rogers v. Rogers, 152 was "whether creditors, who 
obtained a judgment against a husband and a different judgment 
against his wife, may compel the sale of real property owned by the 
husband and wife as tenants by the entireties with right of survivor-
ship to satisfy those judgments. "153 Notwithstanding plaintiff's claim 
that a different result should be allowed where the separate 
judgments are related, the supreme court affirmed the common law 
rule that tenancy by the entirety property is "exempt from the 
claims of creditors who do not have joint judgments against the 
husband and wife."154 
146. See id. at 202, 509 S.E.2d at 304. 
147. See id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 205-06, 509 S.E.2d at 306. 
150. See id. at 204-05, 509 S.E.2d at 304-06. 
151. Id. at 207, 509 S.E.2d at 306. 
152. 257 Va. 323, 512 S.E.2d 821 (1999). 
153. Id. at 324, 512 S.E.2d at 821. 
154. Id. at 326, 512 S.E.2d at 822. 
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K Certificate of Deposit-Husband and Wife-Ownership-
Survivorship 
1099 
The facts established in Patterson v. Patterson155 show that, 
nineteen days prior to her death, wife withdrew $100,000 of her own 
funds from Bank A and turned it over to Husband who deposited it 
in Bank B in their joint names with the right of survivorship, but 
that Wife did not sign Bank B's signature card or in any other way 
ratify the creation of this account.156 After reviewing the evidence, 
the supreme court held that the trial court's decision that Wife "did 
not intend to make a gift to her husband ... is not plainly wrong or 
without adequate evidence to support it and, thus, will not be 
disturbed on appeal."157 
L. Bankruptcy-Tenancy by the Entirety in Personal Property 
Inln re Massey,158 "the sole issue before the court [was] whether, 
under Virginia law, shares of stock and a brokerage account-neither 
of which constitutes proceeds of, or the rents or profits from, tenancy 
by the entireties real estate-can be held as tenants by the entirety 
and thereby claimed exempt under § 522(b)(2)(B), Bankruptcy 
Code."159 The court's opinion, which answers this question in the 
affirmative, contains a comprehensive treatment of Virginia's 
troubled history relating to tenancies by the entireties in personal 
property. 160 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Most of the estate-related legislative and judicial developments 
during the period of this review were positive. However, three of 
these matters deserve attention in the 2000 Session. The joint 
account disclosure provisions161 do not offer a realistic solution to the 
present problems in this area of the law and thus they should be 
either strengthened or repealed before they become effective on 
July 1, 2000. The supreme court's resurrection of the "presumption 
of convenience" from prior bank account law and application thereof 
155. 257 Va. 558, 515 S.E.2d 113 (1999). 
156. See id. at 560, 515 S.E.2d at 114. 
157. Id. at 564, 515 S.E.2d at 116. 
158. 225 B.R. 887 (Banlcr. E.D. Va. 1998). 
159. Id. at 888. 
160. See id. at 889-90. It is this troubled history that led to the 1999 legislation discussed 
in supra Part II.E that attempts to resolve all facets of this issue. 
161. See discussion supra Part Il.H. 
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to investment accounts162 has created an unacceptable confusion for 
the consumer that can only be resolved by legislation. Increased 
recognition of nonprobate transfers at death163 is a worthy goal 
deserving of legislative action. 
162. See discussion supra Part 111.G. 
163. See discussion supra Part 111.H. 
